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Abstract. In recent years, voluntary health insurance costs have become 
a major source of friction in labor-management negotiations. What was once 
a “fringe” has led to job actions, strikes, and intensive bargaining. We examine 
the history of labor’s participation in New York Blue Cross from the 1930s to 
the recent past and show that labor’s participation in the plan was crucial to 
Blue Cross’s success in the plan’s early decades. By the late 1950s, serious 
tensions developed over rate increases and the participation of labor in Blue 
Cross governance. Ultimately, the issue was one of the controi over what was 
provided by the plans and who would pay for the costs of care. We posit that 
labor was never able to achieve an important role in the control of the third- 
party payer, and in the antilabor environment of the 1980s this proved det- 
rimental to labor’s interests. 
The history of Blue Cross may be presented as the story of administra- 
tors, planners, and physicians. Yet this history also reflects the rapidly 
changing social, political, intellectual, and medical environment of New 
York City. In the early 1900s New York City’s labor and immigrant com- 
munities had developed an uneven patchwork of fraternal, union, and com- 
mercial health insurance plans. Although they provided a measure of pro- 
tection, the instability and inadequacy of these self-administered and 
small-scale insurance systems had become evident by the Great Depres- 
sion. Blue Cross was organized in 1935 by the United Hospital Fund and 
the voluntary hospitals of the city and its success was due in part to its 
role in addressing the needs of the city’s laboring population. 
By the end of the Depression large numbers of the city’s residents were 
using the hospital for births, illncss, and death. The hospital was becoming 
an increasingly central component of “good” health care, and this devel- 
opment provided legitimacy to Blue Cross’s rok as a hospital insurance 
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and financing system.’ In the course of World War 11, hundreds of thou- 
sands of soldiers received medical care financed and organized by a third 
party (i.e., the government). On the home front, government decisions 
spurred labor unions to bargain for third-party insurance. During the post- 
war era, millions of workers and their families joined Blue Cross and made 
it the dominant force in New York’s hospital finance system. 
Yet, the very success of Blue Cross in attaining its dominant position 
as an intermediary between union members and the hospitals created new 
tensions that reached a climax in 1960 with the publication of the famous 
Trussell Report. As a result of reforms suggested in that report, and of 
long-term changes during the 1960s, New York’s labor unions developed 
a more prominent voice within Blue Cross as the organization was incor- 
porated into new state and federal planning, regulatory, and financing sys- 
tems. By the 1980s, unions struck to prevent the loss of medical benefits. 
In this paper, we will first trace the ways workers and their families pro- 
vided health services for themselves in the years preceding the development 
of Blue Cross in 1935. Second, we will outline the growing involvement 
of labor in the development of New York’s Blue Cross in the twenty years 
during and following World War II.2 Finally, we will examine the devel- 
oping crisis in the labor-Blue Cross relationship and discuss how it was 
addressed and partially resolved by the Trussell Report. 
Immigrants and health insurance 
Throughout the first half of this century a large portion of New York 
City’s working class was composed of immigrants who had developed fra- 
ternal societies that provided a variety of health and welfare plans. A few 
local unions also developed health and welfare plans in order to provide 
direct service to their membership. These fraternal and union plans were 
a response to the fact that the very life of working-class communities was 
shaped by the reality of accidents, disease, disability, and death. In the 
early twentieth century, increases in productivity were often paid for in 
shorter lives, greater physical suffering, and increased dependence and 
hardship for family members and communities (Montgomery 1987: 192). 
1. During the Depression, discussions over the need for a more systematized nonprofit 
or governmental mechanism for financing hospital services reflected growing popular and 
professional faith in the dissemination of medical advances through “regional hierar- 
chies.” See Fox 1986; Stevens 1989. 
2. The system of insurance coverage is even more complex than we have described 
here. For example, Blue Cross is a hospiral insurance system paying solely for the “hotel” 
costs of a patient’s hospital stay: bed, nursing, opedating room, and other expenses. It 
does not pay for doctors’ services and an entirely different insurance system covers most 
of the physicians’ charges in the hospital, under such insurance companies as Blue Shield, 
Group Health Insurance, Aetna, and others. 
3. As David Montgomery (1987) points out, “If employers thought of the pace of work 
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Many immigrant workers, especially in New York City, developed ex- 
tensive, if inadequate, methods to alleviate some of the harshest conse- 
quences of dependence caused by unemployment, injury, death, old age, 
and illness. Thousands of sick and benevolent societies, fraternal lodges, 
and Landsrnannschaft groups developed in New York City between the 
1880s and 1920s in response to the harsh realities of urban and industrial 
life (Kalet, quoted in Sydenstricker 1917: 142). The extent and adequacy 
of coverage for working populations is unknown (Sydenstricker 1917: 
442).4 But it was asserted by contemporaries that “a large number and a 
variety of collective efforts have been made by the wage earners themselves 
to provide against sickness” (Sydenstricker 1917: 469) .5 A few local unions 
in New York and other large cities developed health and welfare plans that 
sought to address the devastating effects of illness, accidents, and death 
in the life of their members. They reached a relatively small number of 
workers, since only union members were eligible for coverage. They rarely, 
if ever, provided for hospital benefits since, at that time, the home or doc- 
tor’s office was the locus of most care. 
By and large, three major problems plagued many fraternal and union 
health plans. First, few plans were organized with any real sense of the 
demands that would be placed on the system. Generally, reserves were in- 
in terms of the quantity and quality of their factories’ output, workers thought of it in 
terms of their own health and longevity. . . . All [workers] knew that after the average man 
passed his mid-thirties, the amount of working time he lost to sickness and injuries rose 
sharply. Employers could always find new workers, but each worker had only one body 
and one life” (p. 137). Disease and death took an enormous toll on families as “many 
women found themselves widows or keepers of invalid husbands by their forties and fifties 
and were driven to become wage-earners once more” (pp. 15, 16). Even skilled workers 
were old at forty despite their relative autonomy at the workplace. Jewish clothing workers 
struck in 1910, before the famous Triangle Shirtwaist fire, demanding a sanitary com- 
mission to inspect garment shops. German bakers, suffering from “bakers’ disease” de- 
manded that every loaf of bread bear a bakers’ union label so that consumers would know 
that it was baked under hygienic conditions. Consumer groups pushed for unionization of 
bakers and garment workers in order to control unhygienic conditions seen as a source for 
tuberculosis among the industrial and middle-class population of the city. “A Strike for 
Clean Bread” (Survey 1910); “Investigations Have Disclosed the Fact That Unhealthy and 
Poisonous Bread Is Made in Non-Union Bake Shops’’ (Woman’s Label League Journal 
1913). See also Rosner and Markowitz 1985: 507-21; and, for other work detailing the 
concerns of workers in safety and health in the twentieth century, Markowitz and Rosner 
1987. 
4. See Trauner 1977 for a detailed discussion of the centrality of the fraternal societies 
in the development of prepaid care in that city. See Kalet, quoted in Sydenstricker 1917: 
142-53, for a discussion of the extent and inadequacy of the existing plans. 
5. Sydenstricker (1917) pointed out the difficulty of establishing accurate data on the 
overall importance of the fraternal and union plans and noted that few studies had been 
conducted to determine their adequacy. But he believed that existing data suggested that 
the percentage of workers who had some form of health insurance was large (pp. 432- 
34). 
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adequate because most of the fraternal and union funds sought to keep di- 
rect costs to members extremely low (Stevens 1985).6 Second, women and 
children were often excluded and, for the great masses of low-wage work- 
ers, premiums even in the low-cost fraternal plans were prohibitive (Sy- 
denstricker 1917: 471). Third, the plans that grew in the city were restricted 
in the breadth of their coverage. Most plans provided a very limited cash 
benefit that was meant to defray the costs of funerals, drugs, doctors’ bills, 
or hospital care. Yet, few fraternal or union groups could provide more 
than a small percentage of the real costs of an illness as families found 
themselves without income to pay rent, clothing, food, and other bills. The 
cash benefits were paid for relatively brief periods of time and there were 
often exclusions in the policies for nonindustrial accidents and hospitali- 
zation (Sydenstricker 1917: 467-472). 
In the absence of any government insurance and with only a few pro- 
prietary alternatives to look toward, communities of immigrants were 
thrown on their own meager resources to provide themselves with protec- 
tion. One of the few systematic studies of these organizations revealed that 
fourteen fraternal societies and eleven trade unions provided nearly 
125,000 persons with some form of health insurance (Kalet, quoted in Sy- 
denstricker 1917: 143).’ In New York the importance of immigrants’ use 
of fraternal societies was especially great. Among some ethnic groups 
membership was nearly universal. “It is interesting to note . . . that nearly 
all of the Slav families carried insurance in their racial fraternal organi- 
zations which had sick-benefit features, while most of the native-born 
workers who were insured had policies in commercial companies which 
provided for only life and accident insurance” (Sydenstricker 1917: 434). 
The significance of the different patterns of insurance between immigrants 
and the native-born population was that the immigrant groups would ul- 
timately form the membership of Blue Cross. As the hospital became an 
integral part of people’s lives, hospital insurance would be as necessary 
as the older medical plans.* 
6. This is an interesting discussion of the fate of fraternal organizations. We thank 
Jim Maxwell and Peggy Randall for providing us with this reference. 
7. In other studies of other communities, it was found during the early decades of the 
century that upward of 60 percent of workers had health insurance plans through either 
unions or lodges. Death benefit societies were formed through a multitude of immigrant 
organizations. “It is probably true that a large proportion of the workers of the newer 
immigrant groups are insured in agencies and organizations providing health insurance 
than native and older immigrant workers,” one observer noted. “This. . . appears to be 
due to the fact that immigrant fraternal and beneficial societies are closely connected with 
religious and racial organizations . . . which exercise a considerable influence for religious 
and raciaI solidarity.” (Sydenstricker 1917: 433-34). 
8. In the coming years, political organizations such as the Socialist party and, in the 
1930s, the Communist party as well would also support death and sickness plans for their 
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The original two parties to the health and werfare debate 
The provision of health and welfare benefits was an important source of 
conflict between labor and management. Corporations often would provide 
benefits to win the allegiance of the work force itself. Beginning in the 
early nineteenth century, paternalist textile mill owners in Lowell, Mas- 
sachusetts, initiated what became known as the Lowell Plan, in which 
young girls recruited from the countryside to work in the mills were pro- 
vided with dormitory housing, religious training, and community services 
(Dublin 1979). Later in the century, other corporations, most notably rail- 
roads, and logging and mining companies, contracted with physicians to 
provide minimal health services to workers. In 1868, for example, the 
Southern Pacific Railroad established a major industrial medical care pre- 
payment program that continued in existence for nearly a century. In the 
West in 1887, the Homestake Mining Company of Lead, South Dakota, 
established a company-run clinic and hospital. And in the South, the Ten- 
nessee Coal, Iron, and Railroad Company in Birmingham established a 
health department to provide a variety of medical services to employees 
and their dependents. At the beginning of this century, such management 
practices were expanded and developed by large national corporations such 
as International Harvester, which sought to develop a broad health and wel- 
fare program (Berkowitz and McQuaid 1980). 
Management portrayed its various health and welfare programs as a pa- 
ternalist response to the felt needs of the work force. But most union rep- 
resentatives saw them as tools for undermining worker and trade union sol- 
idarity (Asher 1987). Management-initiated programs were seen as 
attempts to make workers dependent upon the goodwill of the company, 
thereby creating a nonmilitant, acquiescent labor force. At best, workers 
saw the programs as inadequate and temporary. At worst, they were per- 
ceived as tools in management’s attempts to cover up the dangers of the 
workplace and to hide deaths or disability caused by unsafe and unclean 
working environments. Because of the distrust of management’s motiva- 
tions, workers and unions themselves organized health and benefit soci- 
eties, self-insurance programs, disability compensation, old-age pensions, 
and even clinics and hospitals (Derickson 1988). In the nineteenth century, 
a wide range of mutual aid and benevolent societies developed. For ex- 
ample, in 1877, the Granite Cutters Union set up the first national union 
members. Some of these groups, such as the Workmen’s Circle, closely affiliated with 
the Socialists, are still around today. The Communist party supported the International 
Workers’ Order, which broke off from the Workmen’s Circle in 1931. The Circle was forced 
out of existence by the New York State Insurance Department in the early 1950s because 
of its earlier affiliation with the Communist party. 
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sick-benefit program. Founded in 1887, the Barbers Union organized a 
sick-benefit system in 1895. The Tobacco Workers Union was established 
in 1895 and developed a sick-benefit program a year later (Klem and 
McKiever 1953). 
By the mid-twentieth century, there were well over two hundred group 
health plans in the country. Of these, two-thirds were organized through 
specific industries either by employers. employees, or joint action (Klem 
1944: 117). Among the more important employee-sponsored plans were the 
Hospital and Medical Care Program of the United Mine Workers of Amer- 
ica Welfare and Retirement Fund; the Labor Health Institute of Saint Louis 
(Local 688, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the American Fed- 
eration of Labor [AFL]); the Health Institute of the United Auto Workers, 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), Detroit; the Union Health 
Center, International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), AFL, 
Boston; the AFL Medical Service Plan of Philadelphia; and the Sidney 
Hillman Medical Center of the Male Apparel Industry of Philadelphia 
(Amalgamated Clothing Workers, ClO) (Klem and McKiever 1953). All 
these programs, especially those affiliated with the United Mine Workers, 
the ILGWU, and the Amalgamated, grew out of labor’s interest in pro- 
viding their members with alternatives to management-sponsored health 
programs. In New York City, unions followed a similar pattern of health 
center organization. The ILGWU, a union organized and led by skilled 
immigrant workers, and born out of early twentieth-century struggles over 
wages and hours and workplace safety and health, organized its own health 
clinic as early as 1913. But other unions, most notably the Hotel Trades 
Council and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, a union with a long so- 
cialist tradition, organized their clinic and health plans in the early 1950s. 
The 1930s are a critical period for understanding labor’s changing at- 
titude toward union-controlled health and welfare programs. During this 
time, under the financial pressures of the Depression and a growing accord 
with the New Deal administration in Washington, labor considered new 
models for the provision of health and welfare services to its members. 
Beginning during the Depression and especially after World War 11, many 
of the fraternal organizations began to decline, as ethnic identification and 
immigrant ties to particular neighborhoods and communities loosened. As 
assimilation proceeded and unions assumed a greater role in the lives of 
New York’s working population, local unions saw insurance as a mech- 
anism for protecting its members and for strengthening the relationship 
between members and their locals. In the 1940s and 1950s company- and 
union-sponsored plans increased, but the major movement was toward non- 
profit third-party insurance e 
During the Depression, organized labor faced innumerable problems as 
millions of its workers found themselves unemployed and dependent. Also, 
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the long-standing supremacy of the American Federation of Labor was 
challenged by the organizing dri\,es in heavy industry spurred by the Con- 
gress of Industrial Organizations. With the development of the CIO in the 
second half of the decade, organized labor faced an internal split in its 
ranks. For the first time in labor history, significant sectors of organized 
labor looked to the national government for support, protection, and advice. 
In the context of the Depression, as the new CIO became deeply involved 
in organizing millions of workers, significant portions of the labor move- 
ment supported governmental programs in the area of social welfare, pro- 
tective legislation, and even hours and wages. Walter Reuther and the 
United Auto Workers (UAW), along with other leaders of the CIO, even 
went so far as to endorse various calls for national health insurance.’ At 
its first national convention in 1938 the CIO supported “a national health 
program” (Starr 1982: 304). This was a dramatic break with the traditions 
of the AFL, which saw national health insurance as a threat to the welfare 
funds numerous locals had built up over the years. The CIO leadership in 
heavy industry accepted the notion of outside control of health and welfare 
benefits, while the AFL insisted on control over its financing. 
Blue Cross and the labor movcment. Organized labor showed a grow- 
ing interest in Blue Cross in the 1930s and 1940s because it could be in- 
corporated into both the local AFL craft union welfare structure as well 
as the national CIO collective bargaining agreements. The AFL welfare 
funds could purchase services from Blue Cross without giving up its au- 
tonomy and the CIO could bargain with the steel and auto industries for 
management to buy service plans. Because Blue Cross was a nonprofit serv- 
9. We do not see it as our mandate to detail the history of medical practice and hospital 
care during the 1930s. Suffice it to say, the hospitals and physicians themselves were 
undergoing their own internal struggle:; over a range of economic and political issues. 
During the 1930s, the long-standing opposition of the American Medical Association 
(AMA) to group practice, national and compulsory health insurance, and “contract” prac- 
tice intensified, and those advocating such programs were often accused of sponsoring 
“socialized” medicine. In all of its actions, the AMA sought to protect the autonomy of 
the practicing physician. The hospital community at this time was struggling through its 
own financial crisis as demand increased and income dwindled. Within this context, the 
first Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans were organized and they incorporated the concerns 
of the professionals who backed them. Blue Cross and Blue Shield promised a way out 
of the hospitals’ and doctors’ dilemma for, while providing a stable source of income to 
their members, they neither depended on government nor, in the words of the medical 
community of the 1930s, “sacrificed the autonomy” of the doctors. 
On the local level, the medical community was involved in a number of parallel efforts 
to counter the growth of group practice and calls for national health insurance. But it was 
also involved in gaining a greater say in a program of direct interest to labor: the admin- 
istration of workers’ compensation. It was here that labor and medicine had their most 
intense and involved relationship and where the first overtures from the medical com- 
munity to labor first developed. 
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ice plan rather than a commercial profit-making indemnity plan, it was 
distanced from labor’s long-standing distrust of commercial plans sus- 
pected of profiteering from the misery of workers and their families (Shurt- 
leff and Cohan 1989). Blue Cross was also attractive because it paid for 
services in hospitals as they were emerging as a central source of health 
care for millions of Americans. Therefore, Blue Cross was seen as a “com- 
munity” plan that addressed pressing community needs without taking 
sides in the heated labor-management conflicts of the Depression and post- 
war period. ’’ 
The special circumstances of World War I1 helped Blue Cross to grow. 
According to a 1943 Internal Revenue Service ruling, fringe benefits were 
not considered income and were therefore not subject to the wage freeze. 
For businesses , furthermore, “legitimate insurance plans for employees 
could be deducted from gross income as a proper business expense,” which 
“stimulated the growth of union health and welfare programs under col- 
lective bargaining” (Klem and McKiever 1953: 7). In addition, war in- 
dustries were reimbursed by the government on the basis of their total costs 
plus a percentage for profit. Thus, if a company paid for its employees’ 
hospital and medical insurance, not only was the entire cost of that program 
passed along to the government but the actual profit to the company was 
increased as well (Mannix n.d.). 
During the postwar years , “the general shift in American labor relations 
from conflict to accommodation” (Starr 1982: 313) helped to solidify the 
importance of Blue Cross to both unions and management alike. A gov- 
ernment study conducted in October 1947 found that 1,250,000 were cov- 
ered by collective bargaining agreements providing hospital protection or 
other health benefits and that this represented a doubling between 1945 and 
1947 (Reed 1947: 66-67). Paul Starr( 1982) documents that “between 1948 
and 1950 the number of workers covered by negotiated health plans jumped 
from 2.7 to more than 7 million. By the end of 1954, 12 million workers 
and 17 million dependents were enrolled in collectively bargained health 
plans.” He further notes that by 1954 “over 60 percent of the population 
had some type of hospital insurance” (p. 313). 
Blue Cross in New York. If the national situation appeared to augur 
well for Blue Cross’s future, the situation in New York City was even rosier. 
Unlike other cities, such as Detroit, Akron, or Pittsburgh, which were dom- 
inated by one or two industries-auto manufacturing, steel production, or 
~ 
10. Before the development of Blue Cross programs, there was no third-party alter- 
native for labor other than commercial insurance, which unions were wary of because of 
their antagonistic encounters with insurance carriers in Workman’s Compensation pro- 
ceedings. 
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rubber, for example-New York was composed primarily of light manu- 
facturing and service work. New York was a strong union town, but it had 
many unions of diverse political orientation. Despite appearances of sol- 
idarity on many common issues, deep antagonisms existed among socialist, 
communist, liberal, and conservative labor leaders. Also, ethnic differ- 
ences tied in with the fractious political scene in New York to complicate 
unified organizing efforts among workers dispersed in a wide variety of 
small , mostly isolated worksites. Garment workers, construction workers , 
department store workers , cigar makers, and furniture makers , all worked 
in sites spread widely throughout the five boroughs. New York’s labor 
unions were dynamic, complex, and highly contentious (Faggen 1989). 
It was during this period of labor unrest and economic dislocation that 
Blue Cross was first organized. During the Depression, the inability of 
patients to pay for their hospital care had forced many institutions to shut 
down or curtail services. In response to this crisis, the United Hospital 
Fund organized this nonprofit insurance plan as a means of providing hos- 
pitals with needed funds and patients with the security of knowing that, 
in case of sickness, their hospitiil costs would be covered. Its early ad- 
vertising boasted that for “pennies a day” New Yorkers could be protected 
from the insecurity caused by the costs associated with illness. Originally 
calling its insurance plan the “3 cents a day plan,” Blue Cross began sign- 
ing up members individually. But within a few months it approached busi- 
ness to sign up “groups” of workers through a payroll deduction plan. 
From the perspective of labor, Blue Cross was a dramatic improvement 
over the commercial carriers who were at that time a major competitor. 
Some unions documented collusion between commercial carriers and man- 
agement. Companies would charge workers for their health insurance at 
the full rate and then, at the end of the year, receive a “dividend” from 
the commercial carrier for every worker covered. In essence, management 
received a kick-back, which came out of the workers’ pockets, for signing 
onto a commercial plan (Shurtleff and Cohan 1989). From the very start, 
Blue Cross promised the labor movement a nonprofit, centrally organized 
administrative mechanism that wcluld provide union workers with a needed 
service. 
The apparent concordance of interest between labor and Blue Cross 
veiled some social tensions and political differences. In the early years, 
labor and Blue Cross leaders were drawn from different social groups. 
These differing ethnic, class, and political party alignments were sources 
of friction,” as early efforts by 131ue Cross to win labor support for the 
11. Harold Faggen, an accountant and lawyer who worked closely with some of the 
unions in the 1950s, was more pointed in his comments about the social origins of Blue 
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plan reflect. During World War 11, leaders of the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations began a dialogue with Blue Cross about the differing per- 
spectives of labor and Blue Cross. In March 1943, Saul Mills, secretary 
of the Greater New York Industrial Union Council, Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, which represented most of the left-wing unions in the city, 
wrote to Louis Pink, former insurance commissioner of New York State 
and then president of Blue Cross of New York, complaining about the lack 
of progress “in meeting some of the apparent shortcomings of the [Blue 
Cross] plan” (Mills 1943). 
Three major issues emerged that initially led the city’s unions to say that 
“they could not now recommend adoption of [the] Blue Cross plan” to their 
membership. The first major issue was the lack of accountability of Blue 
Cross to the unions. The board of directors of Blue Cross was “composed 
predominantly of hospital and medical” people and lacked labor repre- 
sentation. They contended that labor could not endorse a plan when it had 
no voice in the management or control of the plan. Second, they objected 
to Blue Cross’s identification with management. Blue Cross, seeking to 
increase membership, had originally appealed to employers, suggesting 
that adoption of the Blue Cross contract “cost them nothing” because of 
the payroll deduction plan. Labor complained that while management got 
credit for providing a health plan for its members, labor, not management, 
was footing the bill. Blue Cross, in contrast, was wary of allowing too 
much power to slip into the hands of labor. Louis Pink responded to the 
union demand for board membership by stating that “there were no va- 
cancies on the Board at present.” He proposed instead a labor advisory 
committee (Conference Notes 1943). 
Despite their differences, Blue Cross and the unions were able to reach 
a compromise that paved the way for greater participation of labor in Blue 
Cross. Within a year, Elinor Herrick, regional director of the National La- 
bor Relations Board, joined the board for one year. A year later, John D. 
Connors, from the Department of Education, American Federation of La- 
bor, and Saul Mills himself were invited to join the board. Even so, these 
two labor representatives were but a small voice on the twenty-five-member 
board, one half of whom were hospital administrators, trustees, and doc- 
tors, and the other half industry representatives, consumer groups, and 
public officials. Several left-wing unions, nearly all of whom were affil- 
iated with the Greater New York Industrial Union Council, joined Blue 
Cross in the mid- 1940s as a result of these efforts. Among these were pock- 
etbook workers; furniture workers; painters; optical workers; retail drug 
Cross’s leadership. He said that many in the labor movement saw “Btue Cross as a place 
to retire Republicans from Albany” (Faggen 1989). 
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store employees (soon to emerge as representatives of the hospital workers); 
chefs, cooks and pastrycooks; waiters and waitresses; taxi workers; cigar 
workers; fur and leather workers; office and professional workers; cemetery 
workers; meat choppers; and others (Pink 1946). Other early recruits into 
the ranks of Blue Cross were the AFL Building Trades unions, especially 
the Carpenters Union and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
(Shurtleff and Cohan 1989). 
These initiatives led to an enormous expansion of union involvement in 
Blue Cross during the last year of the war and during the postwar years. 
During the last year of the war, from September 1944 through September 
1945, over 340 collective bargaining agreements provided over 175,000 
workers and their families protection. One early government study con- 
cluded prophetically that “the development of union health and welfare 
programs may well have an important effect upon the future growth of Blue 
Cross plans” (Reed 1947: 67). The event that cemented the bond between 
Blue Cross and the unions was the decision in 1946 by the municipal gov- 
ernment to pay for half “the total cost of. . . [medical and] hospital care 
for municipal employees who elect to enroll in [the Health Insurance Plan 
and] . . . Blue Cross” (New York Times 1947). By mid-1946, Blue Cross 
estimated that 550,000 employees and their dependents were covered for 
hospitalization in New York City. This was about one-fifth of its total sub- 
scribers (Pink 1946). 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the growth in union mem- 
bership and the municipal decision to supply Blue Cross insurance to its 
employees. Between 1939 and 1943, the annual increase in premiums to 
Blue Cross was never more than 4 percent. Yet, following the Internal Rev- 
enue Service decision not to consider fringe benefits as income and the 
involvement of the Greater New York Industrial Union Council to provide 
its members with benefits, the annual increase in net premiums grew dra- 
matically. In the years 1944, 1945, and 1946, the annual increase in pre- 
miums rose 17 percent, 27 percent, and 28 percent, respectively. The most 
dramatic rise followed New York City’s decision to provide Blue Cross as 
a fringe to its employees. Between 1946 and 1947, premiums rose 47.4 
percent, the largest percentage increase in the post-Depression era (As- 
sociated Hospital Service n.d.). 
Growing interdependency of labor and Blue Cross. Documents from 
the Blue Cross archives indicate the tremendous attention paid to admin- 
istrative and organizational detail in these early years. Through the working 
out of this detail Blue Cross and the unions became interdependent. One 
example is the case of the Pocketbook Workers Union and their negotiations 
with Blue Cross regarding the collection of members’ fees. In 1946, the 
executive director of the union wrote Louis Pink a detailed memo ex- 
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plaining the problems that his workers would face in subscribing to Blue 
Cross through a payroll deduction scheme. He specifically noted that his 
membership, like that of many of New York’s unions, was not highly con- 
centrated in one or even a few large plants. Rather, his union represented 
workers who were scattered throughout the city. The members worked in 
plants, warehouses, sweatshops, and lofts, many of them “employing less 
than [ten] workers” (Wolinsky 1946). Only a limited number of shops em- 
ployed more than one hundred workers. The problems in administering be- 
nefit programs for his union members were numerous, especially when the 
protection under the Blue Cross plan depended upon unreliable small busi- 
nessmen who failed to pay the premiums necessary to maintain employees’ 
benefits. Few of these shops, Wolinsky held, had the capabilities to main- 
tain up-to-date records of employment and coverage. He suggested that any 
success was really a product of the degree of union control over admin- 
istration and that such control should be increased (Wolinsky 1946). ’*From 
labor’s point of view, central administration of benefits should come 
through the union itself in order to protect workers from inefficient, un- 
caring, and sometimes dishonest businessmen. In New York, the central- 
ized, bureaucratic nature of Blue Cross had a special appeal to the city’s 
union leaders, who found daunting the prospect of administering hospi- 
talization plans for thousands of workers dispersed throughout dozens of 
shops in the various boroughs. Furthermore, Blue Cross sought to accom- 
modate the needs of the numerous small locals scattered throughout the 
city. They allowed individual locals to join with others to qualify for lower 
retention rates and discounts, as well as to certify which of their individual 
workers were qualified to receive coverage (Shurtleff and Cohan 1989). 
The expansion of Blue Cross occurred within the context of massive 
political upheavals within New York’s labor and liberal establishments. 
During the last years of the Depression and World War 11, the American 
Labor party emerged as a powerful force in New York City. It was originally 
organized in 1936 “by leaders of New York’s heavily Jewish garment trades 
to provide a mechanism for supporting Franklin Roosevelt and Fiorello 
LaGuardia,” the charismatic fusion reform mayor (Shefter 1986). The party 
was a coalition of left-wing and liberal politicians and unions. Despite its 
relatively small membership, the party’s importance in local politics can 
be measured by the fact that LaGuardia’s margins of victory in 1937 and 
1941 were by votes cast on the American Labor party line. After World 
War 11, the New Deal coalition between liberals and the Left dissolved. 
12. Wolinsky noted that “the hospitalization service is represented right in our office” 
and “the records of all shop employees are constantly being checked as against the union 
membership on our records.” 
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Liberal labor leaders such as David Dubinsky, president of the International 
Ladies’ Garment Workers Union, and Alex Rose, president of the Hat, Cap, 
and Milliners Union, bolted from the American Labor party, charging that 
it was dominated and controlled by the American Communist party. In its 
stead, these important New York labor leaders organized the Liberal party, 
which had a major political impact on city politics and became tied to the 
anti-communist labor movement in the city. In contrast to the American 
Labor party, which had been organized around Italian, Jewish, and black 
political clubs in the city, the Liberals were much more centrally controlled 
and appealed primarily to the Jewish trade unions and middle class. l 3  These 
changes, together with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, moved 
the mainstream of the union movement in New York farther to the center. 
The political warfare among New York’s labor unions made Blue Cross’s 
organized, bureaucratic structure all the more attractive, taking fringe be- 
nefits out of the contentious arena of union politics. In the words of one 
observer, “In place of precedents, we are now watching a parade . . . a mass 
migration” of unions into Blue Cross (Tilove [ 19501). 
Growing tensions. By the mid- 1950s Blue Cross was the organization 
of choice for the majority of the city’s unions (Shurtleff and Cohan 1989). l4 
But, in the late 1950s, Blue Cross’s requests for rate increases brought to 
the fore tensions between labor and Blue Cross. The ostensible immediate 
issue was that Blue Cross premium increases would take too large a bite 
out of the workers’ fringe benefit package. Some labor representatives ar- 
gued that Blue Cross was maintaining too large a reserve fund; others ar- 
gued that Blue Cross,failed to represent union interests and hold down hos- 
pital costs; still others maintained that unions could save money by insuring 
their own members. But the common complaint among union leaders was 
that despite the nominal labor voice, the Blue Cross board was still un- 
representative of the population that Blue Cross served. 
One indication that some of the unions were unhappy with Blue Cross 
was the decision by the Furniture Workers Union in the mid-1950s to leave 
Blue Cross and insure its own members (Faggen 1989).15 But the warning 
13. See Shefter 1986 for a fascinating and detailed account of the politics of New York 
City in the postwar period. 
14. Shurtleff and Cohan (1989) estimated that between 50 and 70 percent of New York’s 
organized labor force belonged to Blue Cross by the late 1950s and that 72 percent of the 
unions had joined by the mid-1970s. 
15. Harold Faggen, an accountant who consulted with a number of unions and helped 
the Furniture Workers Union to set up its self-insurance fund, was a spokesperson for the 
self-insurance movement. His counterpart, Martin Segal, was an accountant for a number 
of other unions and advocated staying within Blue Cross, while pressing for greater rep- 
resentation and benefits. 
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of the more general crisis in union-Blue Cross relations came in 1956 at 
a meeting sponsored by the Central Trades and Labor Council and the 
Greater New York Fund. At this time, a lone voice, the left-wing leaders 
of District 65 of the United Auto Workers, called on unions to pay greater 
attention to what they considered the huge reserves held by Blue Cross (New 
York Times 1956). New York’s labor movement put aside its factionalism 
to take issue with Blue Cross the next year. In the fall of 1957, when Blue 
Cross asked the insurance commissioner of New York State to approve a 
40 percent rise in the rates charged its members, the New Yurk Times pro- 
claimed: “City and Labor Are against It, Hospitals in Favor” (New Yurk 
Times 1957b). 
In this early skirmish between labor and Blue Cross two major themes 
emerged in the arguments against a rate increase. First, union represen- 
tatives argued that the “crisis” in Blue Cross’s financing was a technical 
accounting problem that could be simply addressed by reorganizing the 
books. At that time Blue Cross was required by the state to maintain a 25 
percent reserve fund. Labor pressed for the reduction of that reserve fund 
rather than a rate increase, because, in the words of an official of the Office 
and Professional Workers Union, they believed that “the annual increase 
in premiums would devastate us, and affect our ability to bargain for higher 
wages’’ (Shurtleff and Cohan 1989). Harold Faggen argued that “by 
slightly altered bookkeeping Blue Cross should show a net profit of more 
than two million rather than a loss for the last year” (New York Times 
1957a). Second, he argued that “commercial thinking and standards were 
creeping into Blue Cross policy making” and that Blue Cross was little 
more than a representative of the hospital industry’s interests. Liberal rep- 
resentatives of the labor movement such as Walter Eisenberg, economic 
consultant to the Central Trades and Labor Council of Greater New York 
and the New York City CIO Council, suggested that “the fundamental idea 
underlying Blue Cross has been and should be that of a joint user and sup- 
plier vehicle for the provision of pre-paid hospital service, rather than a 
non-profit producer’s cooperative run for the primary purpose of stabilizing 
an ever-larger portion of the income of the suppliers, that is, the hospitals” 
(New Yurk Times 1957b). Echoing the historic concern of the AFL to control 
and administer health benefits, and the new centrality of health and welfare 
benefits to organized labor, Eisenberg demanded that Blue Cross reorga- 
nize its board so that 50 percent of its members would be drawn from labor. 
This union analysis struck a responsive chord among the liberal estab- 
lishment throughout the city. Michael M. Davis, a renowned elder states- 
man of health care policy and then chairman of the executive board of the 
Committee of the Nation’s Health, wrote to the Times, observing that the 
Blue Cross governing bodies generally underrepresented the views of labor 
and consumers. He warned that “such policies may cause organized labor 
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. . . to turn away from Blue Cross and seek other forms of hospitalization 
insurance. . . . The public at large, whether Blue Cross subscribers or not, 
has reason to be aggrieved when Blue Cross conducts itself like a self- 
contained private business, instead of an agency having the privileges and 
immunities of a non-profit body established to perform a public service” 
(New York Times 1958a). The New York Times was expanding on this theme 
that New York’s Blue Cross was violating the public trust. In a stinging 
editorial published at the end of 1957, the Times argued that Blue Cross 
had “not given its subscribers and the public the status they should have- 
especially in dealing with the hospitals as to charges.” The editorial con- 
cluded by noting that only one of its directors represented organized labor 
and none represented the city or its employees (New York Times 1957c).I6 
A few months later Blue Cross, citing increased costs and the fact that its 
rates had not been increased since 1 May 1952, applied for an increase of 
about 40 percent. At a public hearing in June 1958, the now-familiar ar- 
guments were repeated (New York Times 1958b).” Shortly thereafter, the 
state superintendent of insurance tried to resolve the differences between 
labor and Blue Cross by granting a rate increase of 22.3 percent (New York 
Times 1958d). 
For nearly a year Blue Cross avoided requests for new rate increases and 
relations between it and the bulk of the New York labor movement remained 
stable, if uneasy. Blue Cross decided to appoint four new directors, three 
of whom were drawn from the ranks of organized labor.’* But this attempt 
to give labor a greater voice was largely offset by other changes on the 
board. Recognizing that a major fight with labor was brewing over Blue 
Cross and the role of organized labor within the hospitals themselves, the 
United Hospital Fund, representing sixty-six voluntary hospitals through- 
out the city, decided in May 1959 to exercise its statutory right to appoint 
twenty-one of the thirty members who elected the Blue Cross board of di- 
rectors. At the board of directors meeting in June 1959, the United Hospital 
Fund “placed seven new members who subscribed to its views on the Blue 
16. Given this kind of opposition, it’s not surprising that the New York state insurance 
commissioner rejected Blue Cross’s rate rise request at the end of January 1958. 
17. See also, New York Times 1958c quoting Bernard Greenberg, an economist for the 
United Steel Workers of America, who spoke on behalf of the state CIO Council and the 
State Federation of Labor: “Labor in New York insists that Blue Cross policies must be 
directed away from the single-minded concern with meeting unquestionably every demand 
of the hospitals and toward a balanced view which impartially gives equal weight to the 
needs of hospitals, subscribers and the public interest.” 
18. The new members of the Blue Cross board were Thomas Carey, district business 
manager of the International Association of Machinists; Louis Hollander, vice president 
of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union; and Charles Zimmerman, a vice president 
of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union. The existing member was Harold J. 
Garno, secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO. 
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Cross Board of Directors and obtained reelection for 10 backers already 
on the Board” (New York Times 1959b). As the New York Times (1959e) 
reported, “the United Hospital Fund exercised its long-unused voting con- 
trol power. . . to assert its right of parentage over [Blue Cross].” Simul- 
taneous with these changes in board membership, Blue Cross decided to 
ask for another increase in its rates of 34.2 percent (New York Times 1959a). 
In order to understand the coming storm of protest from labor and the 
rapidly unfolding events of the coming year, we need to take a step back 
and look at labor’s relationship to the broader hospital industry during the 
late 1950s. At the very same time that the controversy over Blue Cross rate 
requests was unfolding one newly emerging union, Local 1199, led by Leon 
Davis, had begun to organize hospital workers. This organizing drive rep- 
resented a fundamental change in the perception of the voluntary hospitals 
of the city. By the late 1950s, the hospitals were no longer viewed solely 
as paternalistic charity providers. Rather, labor and portions of New York’s 
liberal establishment increasingly perceived Blue Cross to be part of the 
larger health care industry, a sector of the economy that sometimes made 
enormous profits and employed workers at substandard wages. As the per- 
ception of hospitals changed among important elements of New York’s lib- 
eral and left communities, they became the focus of union-organizing 
drives (Fink and Greenberg 1979). In 1957, Davis began the campaign to 
gain recognition for his union from Montefiore Hospital. Between Decem- 
ber 1957 and August 1958, Local 1199 signed up a majority of Montefiore’s 
workers and in March 1959, the union negotiated its first contract with 
Martin Cherkasky, the head of that hospital. Shortly thereafter, 3,500 work- 
ers struck for forty-six days at the city’s major voluntary hospitals. This 
was a bitter and prolonged strike that created deep animosities not only 
between Local 1199 and the voluntary hospitals but also within organized 
labor itself (Fink and Greenberg 1979, 1989). Privately, portions of New 
York’s labor community opposed the strike as ill-advised and divisive, 
since the action was widely portrayed as a strike against patients rather than 
against industry. But in public, the labor movement used the strike to press 
its arguments against rate hikes. It was said that increased rates would be 
used to pay for fancy new equipment, not to better the wages of hospital 
workers. 
The impact of the request for a rate increase at the very time of the strike 
cannot be overestimated (New York Times 1959~).  l 9  Bernard Greenberg, 
19. One of the first labor spokesmen to give testimony at the hearings over Blue Cross 
rate increases in May 1979 was Leon Davis, whose hospital workers were then in the midst 
of a vicious and prolonged struggle with the voluntary hospitals. He demanded that the 
hearing be adjourned until the strike was settled. 
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speaking for the New York State AFL-CIO, denounced the proposed in- 
creases as “excessive and unjustified.” He linked the hearing over Blue 
Cross directly to the ongoing labor struggles when he said that the “in- 
creased rates given to hospitals in past years had not been reflected in higher 
wages for hospital workers” (New York Times 1959d). The pressure from 
organized labor was so great that Mayor Robert Wagner publicly opposed 
the rate increase. In a page 1 story, the New York Times reported that Wag- 
ner, “citing the hospital strike has come out in opposition to Blue Cross’s 
application for rate increases.” The Times continued that the mayor was 
upset that “only a small part of the proposed 34.2 percent increase would 
go to improving the distressingly low wage level of non-professional hos- 
pital workers” (New York Times 1959f).20 While the results of these hear- 
ings were generally favorable to Blue Cross and the hospital industry, the 
rift this created between labor and Blue Cross was profound.*’ The prev- 
alent opinion of labor leaders was that “there was a startling identity be- 
tween the hospitals and Blue Cross” (New York Times 1959d). In the words 
of another observer, Blue Cross was emerging as “little more than a col- 
lection agency for the hospitals” (Greenberg 1961: 33). 
Blue Cross’s image had become linked to that of the voluntary hospital 
during the 1950s. During this decade the hospital was touted as “a tech- 
nological and community institution with little conflict between the two 
goals” (Stevens 1989: 227). But as hospital costs rose and public con- 
sciousness about the unequal access to quality health care increased, this 
benign view of the hospital’s dual functions started to fray. Blue Cross’s 
traditional portrayal of itself as a partner in league with a benevolent com- 
munity institution now took on a new meaning. Its role as a partner of the 
hospitals came under criticism from those who wanted it to play a more 
active regulatory role in holding down hospital rates. Instead, Blue Cross 
paid out more to the hospitals and charged higher premiums to its sub- 
scribers? maintaining its traditional stance as a passive collection agency. 
Blue Cross did not change its way of operating-the critics changed their 
expectations, because of Blue Cross’s critical role in financing the hospital 
system. By the late 1950s this was no longer a “pennies a day” operation. 
Rather, it had emerged as the preeminent financial agent in the city. As 
such, from the unions’ perspective, it had new responsibilities and obli- 
gations to control the costs of medical care to its members. Unions were 
pressing Blue Cross to oversee, if not manage, the costs of care to its mem- 
20. In the end, Blue Cross substantially prevailed against this opposition and the state 
insurance commissioner granted a rise of 26.5 percent. 
21. In the late 1960s hospitals and Blue Cross would become the focus of academic and 
activist critiques. See, e.g., Law 1974 and various publications and pamphlets of Health 
Policy Advisory Center (Health PAC), especially The American Health Empire (1971). 
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bers. Blue Cross’s leaders were taken by surprise at the intensity of the 
anger and frustration that union groups expressed. Only a few years before, 
they believed, “there was mutual respect-the ability to listen to each 
other.” In the early years of the 1950s unions believed that “Blue Cross 
was the best deal in town.” Now it seemed that there was an enormous gulf 
between them (Shurtleff and Cohan 1989). 
The schism had become so severe that in the fall of 1959 the labor move- 
ment in New York threatened to study the feasibility of “using pension and 
welfare trust funds to build and operate hospitals and insurance programs 
for hospital and medical care” (New York Times 19591.1). Harry Van Ars- 
dale, Jr., president of the New York City Central Labor Council, “reported 
that 26 major New York unions were represented in a special committee 
on health and hospitals authorized by the council .” He directly connected 
the formation of this committee to the bitter struggle to form the hospital 
union and the displeasure with Blue Cross administration and programs. 
Van Arsdale said, “We have sweat shop health standards in our hospitals. 
They underpay their staffs and underserve their patients. Yet, we are con- 
fronted with sky-rocketing costs that must be paid out of our Welfare 
Funds. . . . The program is under the control of big business and the hos- 
pital administrators. We intend to develop the program that will benefit all 
the people of the city” (New York Times 1959g). 
The threat to organize an independent labor-controlled hospital system 
was little more than a rhetorical device to bring attention to labor’s frus- 
tration. The labor movement itself was divided and this proposal had little 
chance of being acted upon in the highly contentious and competitive New 
York labor scene. But their threat to do so was not simply the result of a 
temporary pique. Union leaders rejected calls from the hospital and Blue 
Cross representatives that “we all work together on this” (New York Times 
19591). 
In the midst of this controversy, the Trussell Report, a study conducted 
by members of Columbia University’s School of Public Health to assess 
health planning in the state, was released. The report spoke to a number 
of issues that had been causing friction between labor and Blue Cross over 
the years. It recommended, for example, that the New York State Rate- 
Setting Commission and regional councils be broadly representative and 
should include hospital and medical organizations, labor, industry, and lo- 
cal health and welfare departments. It acknowledged that more rate rises 
were inevitable, both because of constantly increasing hospital costs, and 
because the public had been receiving care “subsidized by underpaid hos- 
pital personnel.” The report went on to urge Blue Cross to “overhaul their 
own Board of Directors to make them more representative.” It specifically 
suggested that “not more than half the Board members be hospital trustees, 
physicians, hospital administrators or other professional personnel” (New 
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York Times 1960a). Ray Trussell, a professor at Columbia University, rec- 
ognized the ongoing struggle between labor and the hospital industry of 
New York as a significant factor in shaping the health care system. Both 
in the report and subsequent comments, he sought to link the crisis in the 
health system to the crisis in labor-industry relations. In calling for a re- 
structuring of New York’s health system, he and his staff sought to provide 
an alternative to what was then emerging as a severe Blue Cross-labor 
confrontation. He sought to create the conditions that would reestablish the 
credibility of Blue Cross as a reasonable third party in providing health 
insurance to the work force as well as a partner in the mechanism to control 
the rising costs of the new hospital and health industry. “The survival of 
Blue Cross is ‘entirely up to labor and industry,’ according to Dr. Ray E. 
Trussell ,” reported the Times in 1960. “ ‘They are the major decision-mak- 
ers-they could pull the rug right out and then decide what other way to 
provide care,’ he declared” (New York Times 1960b). 
Labor’s loss of power 
Despite the rhetoric of the union movement, by the late 1950s, much of 
the control over health care had already passed to third parties-organi- 
zations and professionals outside of the traditional arena of labor-man- 
agement strife. Health care in New York had, indeed, become a major in- 
dustry. Federal support for medical school research, the development of 
health planning agencies, the provision of federal and state monies for the 
construction of hospitals, and a host of other changes had solidified the 
control that professionals, physicians, and insurance companies exerted 
over the system. Furthermore, the apparent successes of medical science 
had led many in the liberal labor community to believe that health issues 
were truly amenable to scientific intervention. In this context, labor had 
little chance to build an alternative set of institutions or develop a system 
of care that could bypass professionals and institutions perceived to be at 
the cutting edge of good health care. New York’s labor movement made 
the decision to join Blue Cross during the 1940s and 1950s because it im- 
plicitly recognized that it had neither the resources nor the desire to develop 
its own institutions. 
The significance of labor’s involvement in the history of Blue Cross has 
generally been neglected. Yet, for a number of reasons, labor’s history is 
critical. It was important because union members formed the base of Blue 
Cross in New York. But labor’s participation in Blue Cross was not without 
controversy. Their stormy relationship was rooted in labor’s own history 
and its own diverse social and political assumptions. The obvious conflicts 
appeared concrete, revolving around rates, comprehensiveness of services, 
and number of directors. Yet, underlying these issues was a desire on the 
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part of labor to have a full voice in Blue Cross. As fringe benefits and, 
specifically, health insurance emerged in the post- World War I1 era as crit- 
ical issues in management-labor negotiations, unions saw Blue Cross in a 
new light. While Blue Cross itself may have continued to see its role as 
an intermediary between consumers and the city’s hospitals, labor now saw 
it as part of an enormous industry that was consuming labor’s resources 
without labor’s representation. Until World War 11, labor and its immigrant 
constituents had developed their own insurance systems. They had joined 
Blue Cross because of its image as a community service organization dur- 
ing and after the war. They gave up their claim to sovereignty over health 
services in the belief that third parties would adequately represent labor’s 
interests. But as hospital rates rose and Blue Cross increased its own pre- 
miums to keep pace, this quid pro quo was eroded. 
In the 1960s, the unions achieved a greater voice on the Blue Cross board 
and found some common ground with its new leadership. Union leaders 
not only served on the board but also were hired to fill important positions 
within the Blue Cross hierarchy. More importantly, they achieved greater 
influence through the development of state and federal regulatory activities. 
The confrontation that labor created over the rate hikes in the late 1950s 
ushered in the profound realignments among labor, Blue Cross, and the 
state as voluntary and, later, regulatory agencies became the new battle- 
grounds in the struggles over the financing and regulation of health care.22 
But, by the late 1970s and 1980s, what the union movement had really 
given up was brought into sharp relief. The labor movement, forced by 
antilabor federal and state policies, had to make concessions in a host of 
areas from wages and working conditions straight through health and re- 
tirement benefits. By the late 1980s, it had become apparent that health 
benefits themselves were being eroded and that the labor movement had 
little ability to shape the behavior of Blue Cross or other insurance com- 
panies without resorting directly to strikes and job actions. The fact that 
Blue Cross had representatives of labor on its governing councils did noth- 
ing to protect labor from management decisions to undercut the scope and 
cost of health benefits. Strikes and labor actions increasingly focused on 
protecting health benefits from management-led attempts to limit health 
insurance benefits and costs. Despite the post-World War I1 accord be- 
tween management and labor to support the growth of the voluntary health 
insurance sector, by the 1980s, health care had, in the words of the Los 
Angeles Times, “become one of the stickiest issues in U.S. labor relations” 
(Los Angeles Times 1989). 
22. During the 1960s, it appears that Blue Cross took on a more adversarial relationship 
with the hospitals. See Shurtleff 1975 for information concerning a series of lawsuits be- 
tween Blue Cross and the hospital industry. 
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In the summer of 1989, the real import of health benefits as a labor- 
management issue was brought home by the extended strike of the various 
“Baby Bell” telephone companies including New York, California, and 
thirteen other states in the Northeast, Midwest, and West Coast. In what 
the Los Angeles Times headline proclaimed was a “Phone Strike Centered 
on Issue of Health Care,” workers at NYNEX, Pacific Bell, and Bell At- 
lantic went out on strike over management’s insistence that the unions pay 
a greater portion of their health care premiums (Lox Angeles Times 1989). 
In contrast to their willingness to grant wage concessions throughout most 
of the 1980s, unions and their membership struck to protect what was once 
considered a fringe benefit. What had been a trivial cost to companies in 
the 1940s and 1950s had risen to 7.9 percent of payroll in 1984 and 13.6 
percent by 1989 (Wall Street Journal 1989a). Unable to control the industry 
that had formed around hospitals, doctors, drug companies, and insurance 
companies, portions of the labor movement redefined its central mission: 
the fringes of the 1940s and 1950s were now central concerns. 
It is significant that the Communication Workers of America made health 
care the central issue of the strike and in the final settlement was willing 
to sacrifice wage increases to protect health benefits (Wall Street Journal 
1989b). In the words of one union local president engaged in the bitter 
communication workers strike: ‘“It took us 40 years of collective bar- 
gaining’ to reach a contract in which the employer contributed all of the 
costs of health care, ‘and now they want to go in one fell swoop backward’” 
(Los Angeles Times 1989). 
The historical study of labor and Blue Cross gives us some distance on 
the growing debate over who should pay for health care costs. In large part, 
labor and management fueled the growth of the health industry. Yet labor 
has allowed the control of health care to escape them over the course of 
the last half century. In a more affluent era its lack of control over resources 
and services was obscured by rising wages and improving benefit packages; 
in these more stringent times the double-edged nature of those postwar 
decisions to give up control to third parties becomes more apparent. 
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